A People's War?

By certain evidence, World War II was the most popular war the United States had ever fought. Never had a greater proportion of the country participated in a war: 18 million served in the armed forces, 10 million overseas; 25 million workers gave of their pay envelope regularly for war bonds. But could this be considered a manufactured support, since all the power of the nation—not only of the government, but the press, the church, and even the chief radical organizations—was behind the calls for all-out war? Was there an undercurrent of reluctance; were there unpublicized signs of resistance?

It was a war against an enemy of unspeakable evil. Hitler's Germany was extending totalitarianism, racism, militarism, and overt aggressive warfare beyond what an already cynical world had experienced. And yet, did the governments conducting this war—England, the United States, the Soviet Union—represent something significantly different, so that their victory would be a blow to imperialism, racism, totalitarianism, militarism, in the world?

Would the behavior of the United States during the war—in military action abroad, in treatment of minorities at home—be in keeping with a "people's war"? Would the country's wartime policies respect the rights of ordinary people everywhere to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? And would postwar America, in its policies at home and overseas, exemplify the values for which the war was supposed to have been fought?
These questions deserve thought. At the time of World War II, the atmosphere was too dense with war fervor to permit them to be aired.

For the United States to step forward as a defender of helpless countries matched its image in American high school history textbooks, but not its record in world affairs. It had instigated a war with Mexico and taken half of that country. It had pretended to help Cuba win freedom from Spain, and then planned itself in Cuba with a military base, investments, and rights of intervention. It had seized Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Guam, and fought a brutal war to subjugate the Filipinos. It had “opened” Japan to its trade with gunboats and threats. It had declared an “Open Door” policy in China as a means of assuring that the United States would have opportunities equal to other imperial powers in exploiting China. It had sent troops to Peking with other nations, to assert Western supremacy in China, and kept them there for over thirty years.

While demanding an open door in China, it had insisted (with the Monroe Doctrine and many military interventions) on a “closed door” in Latin America—that is, closed to everyone but the United States. It had engineered a revolution against Colombia and created the “independent” state of Panama in order to build and control the canal. It sent five thousand marines to Nicaragua in 1926 to counter a revolution, and kept a force there for seven years. It intervened in the Dominican Republic for the fourth time in 1916 and kept troops there for eight years. It intervened for the second time in Haiti in 1915 and kept troops there for nineteen years. Between 1900 and 1933, the United States intervened in Cuba four times, in Nicaragua twice, in Panama six times, in Guatemala once, in Honduras seven times. By 1924 the finances of half of the twenty Latin American states were being directed to some extent by the United States. By 1935, over half of U.S. steel and cotton exports were being sold in Latin America.

Just before World War I ended, in 1918, an American force of seven thousand landed at Vladivostok as part of an Allied intervention in Russia, and remained until early 1920. Five thousand more troops were landed at Archangel, another Russian port, also as part of an Allied expeditionary force, and stayed for almost a year. The State Department told Congress: “All these operations were to offset effects of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia.”

In short, if the entrance of the United States into World War II was (as so many Americans believed at the time, observing the Nazi invasions) to defend the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of other countries, the nation’s record cast doubt on its ability to uphold that principle.
What seemed clear at the time was that the United States was a democracy with certain liberties, while Germany was a dictatorship persecuting its Jewish minority, imprisoning dissidents, whatever their religion, while proclaiming the supremacy of the Nordic "race." However, blacks, looking at anti-Semitism in Germany, might not see their own situation in the U.S. as much different. And the United States had done little about Hitler's policies of persecution. Indeed, it had joined England and France in appeasing Hitler throughout the thirties. Roosevelt and his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, were hesitant to criticize publicly Hitler's anti-Semitic policies; when a resolution was introduced in the Senate in January 1934 asking the Senate and the president to express "surprise and pain" at what the Germans were doing to the Jews and to ask restoration of Jewish rights, the State Department made sure the resolution was buried.

When Mussolini's Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, the U.S. declared an embargo on munitions but let American businesses send oil to Italy in huge quantities, which was essential to Italy's carrying on the war. When a Fascist rebellion took place in Spain in 1936 against the elected socialist-liberal government, the Roosevelt administration sponsored a neutrality act that had the effect of shutting off help to the Spanish government while Hitler and Mussolini gave critical aid to Franco.

Was this simply poor judgment, an unfortunate error? Or was it the logical policy of a government whose main interest was not stopping Fascism but advancing the imperial interests of the United States? For those interests, in the thirties, an anti-Soviet policy seemed best. Later, when Japan and Germany threatened U.S. world interests, a pro-Soviet, anti-Nazi policy became preferable. Roosevelt was as much concerned to end the oppression of Jews as Lincoln was to end slavery during the Civil War; their priority in policy (whatever their personal compassion for victims of persecution) was not minority rights, but national power.

It was not Hitler's attacks on the Jews that brought the United States into World War II, any more than the enslavement of four million blacks brought Civil War in 1861. Italy's attack on Ethiopia, Hitler's invasion of Austria, his takeover of Czechoslovakia, his attack on Poland – none of those events caused the United States to enter the war, although Roosevelt did begin to give important aid to England.

What brought the United States fully into the war was the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. Surely it was not the humane concern for Japan's bombing of civilians that led to Roosevelt's outraged call for war – Japan's attack on
China in 1937, her bombing of civilians at Nanking, had not provoked the United States to war. It was the Japanese attack on a link in the American Pacific empire that did it.

So long as Japan remained a well-behaved member of that imperial club of Great Powers who – in keeping with the open-door policy – were sharing the exploitation of China, the United States did not object. It had exchanged notes with Japan in 1917 saying “the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China.” In 1928, according to Akira Iriye (After Imperialism), American consuls in China supported the coming of Japanese troops. It was when Japan threatened potential U.S. markets by its attempted takeover of China, but especially as it moved toward the tin, rubber, and oil of Southeast Asia, that the United States became alarmed and took those measures which led to the Japanese attack: a total embargo on scrap iron, a total embargo on oil in the summer of 1941.

Once joined with England and Russia in the war (Germany and Italy declared war on the United States right after Pearl Harbor), did the behavior of the United States show that her war aims were humanitarian, or centered on power and profit? Was she fighting the war to end the control by some nations over others or to make sure the controlling nations were friends of the United States?

In August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met off the coast of Newfoundland and released to the world the Atlantic Charter, setting forth noble goals for the postwar world, saying their countries “seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other,” and that they respected “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.” The charter was celebrated as declaring the right of nations to self-determination.

Two weeks before the Atlantic Charter, however, the acting U.S. secretary of state, Sumner Welles, had assured the French government that they could keep their empire intact after the end of the war. In late 1942, Roosevelt’s personal representative assured French General Henri Giraud: “It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will be re-established as soon as possible throughout all the territory, metropolitan or colonial, over which flew the French flag in 1939.”

In the headlines were the battles and troop movements: the invasion of North Africa in 1942; Italy in 1943; the massive, dramatic cross-Channel invasion of German-occupied France in 1944; the bitter battles as Germany was pushed back toward and over her frontiers; the increasing
bombardment by the British and American air forces. And, at the same
time, the Russian victories over the Nazi armies (the Russians, by the time
of the cross-Channel invasion, had driven the Germans out of Russia, and
were engaging 80 percent of the German troops). In the Pacific, in 1943
and 1944, there was the island-by-island move of American forces toward
Japan, finding closer and closer bases for the thunderous bombardment of
Japanese cities.

Quietly, behind the headlines in battles and bombings, American
diplomats and businessmen worked hard to make sure that when the war
ended, American economic power would be second to none in the world.
United States business would penetrate areas that up to this time had been
dominated by England. The open-door policy of equal access would be
extended from Asia to Europe, meaning that the United States intended to
push England aside and move in.

That is what happened to the Middle East and its oil. Saudi Arabia was
the largest oil pool in the Middle East. Its king, Ibn Saud, was a guest of
President Roosevelt on a U.S. cruiser in early 1945.

Roosevelt then wrote to Ibn Saud, promising the United States would
not change its Palestine policy without consulting the Arabs. In later
years, the concern for oil would constantly compete with political concern
for the Jewish state in the Middle East, but at this point, oil seemed more
important.

With British imperial power collapsing during World War II, the
United States was ready to move in. Before the war was over, the adminis-
tration was planning the outlines of the new international economic order,
based on partnership between government and big business.

The poet Archibald MacLeish, then an assistant secretary of state,
spoke critically of what he saw in the postwar world: "As things are now
going, the peace we will make, the peace we seem to be making, will be a
peace of oil, a peace of gold, a peace of shipping, a peace, in brief ... with-
out moral purpose or human interest ...."

During the war, England and the United States set up the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund to regulate international exchanges of currency;
voting would be proportional to capital contributed, so American domi-
nance would be assured. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development was set up, supposedly to help reconstruct war-destroyed
areas, but one of its first objectives was, in its own words, "to promote for-
eign investment."

The economic aid countries would need after the war was already
seen in political terms: Averell Harriman, ambassador to Russia, said in early 1944: "Economic assistance is one of the most effective weapons at our disposal to influence European political events in the direction we desire."

The creation of the United Nations during the war was presented to the world as international cooperation to prevent future wars. But the U.N. was dominated by the Western imperial countries—the United States, England, and France—and a new imperial power, with military bases and powerful influence in Eastern Europe—the Soviet Union. An important conservative Republican senator, Arthur Vandenburg, wrote in his diary about the United Nations Charter:

The striking thing about it is that it is so conservative from anationalist standpoint. It is based virtually on a four-power alliance .... This is anything but a wild-eyed internationalist dream of a world State .... I am deeply impressed (and surprised) to find Hull so carefully guarding our American veto in his scheme of things.

The plight of Jews in German-occupied Europe, which many people thought was at the heart of the war against the Axis, was not a chief concern of Roosevelt. Henry Feingold’s research (The Politics of Rescue) shows that, while the Jews were being put in camps and the process of annihilation was beginning that would end in the horrifying extermination of six million Jews and millions of non-Jews, Roosevelt failed to take steps that might have saved thousands of lives. He did not see it as a high priority; he left it to the State Department, and in the State Department anti-Semitism and a cold bureaucracy became obstacles to action.

Was the war being fought to establish that Hitler was wrong in his ideas of white Nordic supremacy over "inferior" races? The United States’ armed forces were segregated by race. When troops were jammed onto the Queen Mary in early 1945 to go to combat duty in the European theater, the blacks were stowed down in the depths of the ship near the engine room, as far as possible from the fresh air of the deck, in a bizarre reminder of the slave voyages of old.

The Red Cross, with government approval, separated the blood donations of black and white. It was, ironically, a black physician named Charles Drew who developed the blood-bank system. He was put in charge of the wartime donations, and then fired when he tried to end blood segregation. Despite the urgent need for wartime labor, blacks were still being discriminated against for jobs. A spokesman for a West Coast avia-
tion plant said: "The Negro will be considered only as janitors and in other similar capacities .... Regardless of their training as aircraft workers, we will not employ them." Roosevelt never did anything to enforce the orders of the Fair Employment Practices Commission he had set up.

The Fascist nations were notorious in their insistence that the woman's place was in the home. Yet, the war against Fascism, although it utilized women in defense industries where they were desperately needed, took no special steps to change the subordinate role of women. The War Manpower Commission, despite the large numbers of women in war work, kept women off its policymaking bodies. A report of the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor, by its director, Mary Anderson, said the War Manpower Commission had "doubts and uneasiness" about "what was then regarded as a developing attitude of militancy or a crusading spirit on the part of women leaders ...."

In one of its policies, the United States came close to direct duplication of Fascism. This was in its treatment of the Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast. After the Pearl Harbor attack, anti-Japanese hysteria spread in the government. One congressman said: "I'm for catching every Japanese in America, Alaska and Hawaii now and putting them in concentration camps .... Damn them! Let's get rid of them!"

Franklin D. Roosevelt did not share this frenzy, but he calmly signed Executive Order 9066, in February 1942, giving the army the power, without warrants or indictments or hearings, to arrest every Japanese-American on the West Coast -- 11,000 men, women, and children -- take them from their homes, transport them to camps far into the interior, and keep them there under prison conditions. Three-fourths of these were Nisei-children born in the United States of Japanese parents and therefore American citizens. The other fourth -- the Issei, born in Japan -- were barred by law from becoming citizens. In 1944 the Supreme Court upheld the forced evacuation on the grounds of military necessity.

The Japanese remained in those camps for over three years. There were strikes, petitions, mass meetings, refusal to sign loyalty oaths, riots against the camp authorities. The Japanese Michi Weglyn was a young girl when her family experienced evacuation and detention. She tells *Years of Infamy* of bungling in the evacuation, of misery, but also of resistance.

It was a war waged by a government whose chief beneficiary -- despite volumes of reforms -- was a wealthy elite. By 1941 three-fourths of the value of military contracts were handled by fifty-six large corpora-
tions. Of $1 billion spent on scientific research in industry, $400 million went to ten large corporations.

Although twelve million workers were organized in the CIO and AFL, labor was in a subordinate position. Labor-management committees were set up in five thousand factories, as a gesture toward industrial democracy, but they acted mostly as disciplinary groups for absentee workers, and devices for increasing production.

Despite the overwhelming atmosphere of patriotism and total dedication to winning the war, despite the no-strike pledges of the AFL and CIO, many of the nation's workers, frustrated by the freezing of wages while business profits rocketed skyward, went on strike. During the war, there were 14,000 strikes, involving 6,770,000 workers, more than in any comparable period in American history. In 1944 alone, a million workers were on strike, in the mines, in the steel mills, in the auto and transportation equipment industries. When the war ended, the strikes continued in record numbers – 3 million on strike in the first half of 1946.

Beneath the noise of enthusiastic patriotism, there were many people who thought war was wrong, even in the circumstances of Fascist aggression. Out of 10 million drafted for the armed forces during World War II, only 43,000 refused to fight. Many more did not show up for the draft at all. The government lists about 350,000 cases of draft evasion. And this in the face of an American community almost unanimously for the war.

The literature that followed World War II, James Jones's *From Here to Eternity*, Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, and Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead*, captured the GI anger against the army "brass." In *The Naked and the Dead*, the soldiers talk in battle, and one of them says: "The only thing wrong with this Army is it never lost a war."

Toglio was shocked. "You think we ought to lose this one?"

Red found himself carried away. "What have I against the goddam Japs? You think I care if they keep this fuggin jungle? What's it to me if Cummings gets another star?"

"General Cummings, he's a good man," Martinez said. "There ain't a good officer in the world," Red stated.

There seemed to be widespread indifference, even hostility, on the part of the Negro community to the war despite the attempts of Negro newspapers and Negro leaders to mobilize black sentiment. A black journalist wrote: "The Negro ... is angry, resentful, and utterly apathetic about the war. 'Fight for what?' he is asking."
A student at a Negro college told his teacher: "The Army jim-crows us. The Navy lets us serve only as messmen. The Red Cross refuses our blood. Employers and labor unions shut us out. Lynchings continue. We are disenfranchised, jim-crowed, spat upon. What more could Hitler do than that?"

NAACP leader Walter White repeated this to a black audience of several thousand people in the Midwest, thinking they would disapprove, but instead, as he recalled: "To my surprise and dismay the audience burst into such applause that it took me so e thirty or forty seconds to quiet it."

But there was no organized Negro opposition to the war. In fact, there was little organized opposition from any source. The Communist party was enthusiastically in support. The Socialist party was divided, unable to make a clear statement one way or the other.

A few small anarchist and pacifist groups refused to back the war. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom said: "... war between nations or classes or races cannot permanently settle conflicts or he al the wounds that brought them into being." The Catholic Worker wrote: "We are still pacifists ...."

The difficulty of merely calling for "peace" in a world of capitalism, Fascism, Communism – dynamic ideologies, aggressive actions – troubled some pacifists. They began to speak of "revolutionary nonviolence." A. J. Muste of the Fellowship of Reconciliation said that the world was in the midst of a revolution, and those against violence must take revolutionary action, but without violence. A movement of revolutionary pacifism would have to "make effective contacts with oppressed and minority groups such as Negroes, share-croppers, industrial workers."

Only one organized socialist group opposed the war unequivocally. This was the Socialist Workers Party. In Minneapolis in 1943, eighteen members of the party were convicted for violating the Smith Act, which made it a crime to join any group that advocated "the overthrow of government by force and violence." They were sentenced to prison terms, and the Supreme Court refused to review their case.

A few voices continued to insist that the real war was inside each nation: Dwight Macdonald 's wartime magazine Politics presented, in early 1945, an article by the French worker-philosopher Simone Weil:

Whether the mask is labelled Fascism, Democracy, or Dictatorship of the Proletariat, our great adversary remains the Apparatus – the bureaucracy, the police, the military .... [T]he worst betrayal will always be to subordinate ourselves to this Apparatus, and to trample underfoot, in its service, all human values in ourselves and in others.
Still, the vast bulk of the American population was mobilized, in the army, and in civilian life, to fight the war, and the atmosphere of war enveloped more and more Americans. Public opinion polls show large majorities of soldiers favoring the draft for the postwar period. Hatred against the enemy, against the Japanese particularly, became widespread. Racism was clearly at work. *Time* magazine, reporting the battle of Iwo Jima, said: "The ordinary unreasoning Jap is ignorant. Perhaps he is human. Nothing ... indicates it."

So, there was a mass base of support for what became the heaviest bombardment of civilians ever undertaken in any war: the aerial attacks on German and Japanese cities.

Italy had bombed cities in the Ethiopian war; Italy and Germany had bombed civilians in the Spanish civil war; at the start of World War II German planes dropped bombs on Rotterdam in Holland, Coventry in England, and elsewhere. Roosevelt had described these as "inhuman barbarism that has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity."

These German bombings were very small compared with the British and American bombings of German cities. In January 1943 the Allies met at Casablanca and agreed on large-scale air attacks to achieve "the destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."

And so, the saturation bombing of German cities began – with thousand-plane raids on Cologne, Essen, Frankfurt, Hamburg. The English flew at night with no pretense of aiming at "military" targets; the Americans flew in the daytime and pretended precision, but bombing from high altitudes made that impossible. The climax of this terror bombing was the bombing of Dresden in early 1945, in which the tremendous heat generated by the bombs created a vacuum into which fire leaped swiftly in a great firestorm through the city. More than 100,000 died in Dresden.

The bombing of Japanese cities continued the strategy of saturation bombing to destroy civilian morale; one nighttime firebombing of Tokyo took 80,000 lives. And then, on August 6, 1945, came the lone American plane in the sky over Hiroshima, dropping the first atomic bomb, leaving perhaps 100,000 Japanese dead, and tens of thousands more slowly dying from radiation poisoning. Twelve U.S. navy fliers in the Hiroshima city jail were killed in the bombing, a fact that the U.S. government has never officially acknowledged. Three days later, a second atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki, with perhaps 50,000 killed.
The justification for these atrocities was that this would end the war quickly, making an invasion of Japan unnecessary. Such an invasion would cost a huge number of lives, the government said — a million, according to Secretary of State Byrnes; half a million, Truman claimed was the figure given him by Gen. George Marshall. These estimates of invasion losses were not realistic and seem to have been pulled out of the air to justify bombings that, as their effects became known, horrified more and more people.

Japan, by August 1945, was in desperate shape and ready to surrender. New York Times military analyst Hanson Baldwin wrote, shortly after the war: "The enemy, in a military sense, was in a hopeless strategic position by the time the Potsdam demand for unconditional surrender was made on July 26. Such then, was the situation when we wiped out Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Need we have done it? No one can, of course, be positive, but the answer is almost certainly negative."

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, set up by the War Department in 1944 to study the results of aerial attacks in the war, interviewed hundreds of Japanese civilian and military leaders after Japan surrendered, and reported just after the war: "... certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

But could American leaders have known this in August 1945? The answer is, clearly, yes. The Japanese code had been broken, and Japan’s messages were being intercepted. It was known the Japanese had instructed their ambassador in Moscow to work on peace negotiations with the Allies. On July 13, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo wired his ambassador in Moscow: "Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace .... "

If only the Americans had not insisted on unconditional surrender—that is, if they were willing to accept one condition to the surrender, that the emperor, a holy figure to the Japanese, remain in place — the Japanese would have agreed to stop the war. (In fact, when the war ended, the emperor was allowed to remain.)

Why did the United States not take that small step to save both American and Japanese lives? Was it because too much money and effort had been invested in the atomic bomb not to drop it? Or was it, as British scientist P. M. S. Blackett suggested (Fear, War, and the Bomb) that the United
States was anxious to drop the bomb before the Russians entered the war against Japan?

The Russians had secretly agreed (they were officially not at war with Japan) they would come into the war ninety days after the end of the European war. That turned out to be May 8, and so, on August 8, the Russians were due to declare war on Japan. But by then the big bomb had been dropped, and the next day a second one would be dropped on Nagasaki; the Japanese would surrender to the United States, not the Russians, and the United States would be the occupier of postwar Japan. A diary entry for July 28, 1945, by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, described Secretary of State James F. Byrnes as “most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in."

Truman had said, "The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians." It was a preposterous statement. Those 100,000 killed in Hiroshima were almost all civilians. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey said in its official report: "Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets because of their concentration of activities and population."

The dropping of the second bomb on Nagasaki seems to have been scheduled in advance, and no one has ever been able to explain why it was dropped. Was it because this was a plutonium bomb whereas the Hiroshima bomb was a uranium bomb? Were the dead and irradiated of Nagasaki victims of a scientific experiment? Among the Nagasaki dead were probably American prisoners of war. An army report warned of this, but the plan remained unchanged.

True, the war then ended quickly. Italy had been defeated a year earlier. Germany had recently surrendered, crushed primarily by the armies of the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front, aided by the Allied armies on the West. Now Japan surrendered. The Fascist powers were destroyed.

But what about fascism – as idea, as reality? Were its essential elements – militarism, racism, imperialism – now gone? Or were they absorbed into the already poisoned bones of the victors?

The victors were the Soviet Union and the United States (also England, France, and Nationalist China, but they were weak). Both these countries now went to work, under the cover of "socialism" on one side, and "democracy" on the other, to carve out their own empires of influence. They proceeded to share and contest with one another the domination of the world, to build military machines far greater than the Fascist
countries had built, to control the destinies of more countries than Hitler, Mussolini, and Japan had been able to do.

They also acted to control their own populations, each country with its own techniques—crude in the Soviet Union, sophisticated in the United States—to make their rule secure.

The war brought big gains in corporate profits, but it also brought higher prices for farmers, higher wages, enough prosperity for enough of the population to assure against the rebellions that so threatened the thirties.

It was an old lesson learned by governments: that war solves problems of control. Charles E. Wilson, the president of General Electric Corporation, was so happy about the wartime situation that he suggested a continuing alliance between business and the military for "a permanent war economy."

That is what happened. The American public was war-weary, but the Truman administration (Roosevelt had died in April 1945) worked to create an atmosphere of crisis and cold war. True, the rivalry with the Soviet Union was real—that country, which had come out of the war with its economy wrecked and 20 million people dead, was making an astounding comeback, rebuilding its industry, regaining military strength. The Truman administration, however, presented the Soviet Union as not just a rival but an immediate threat.

In a series of moves abroad and at home, it established a climate of fear—a hysteria about Communism—which would steeply escalate the military budget and stimulate the economy with war-related orders. This combination of policies would permit more aggressive actions abroad, more repressive actions at home.

Revolutionary movements in Europe and Asia were described to the American public as examples of Soviet expansionism—thus recalling the indignation against Hitler's aggressions.

In Greece, under a right-wing dictatorship, opponents of the regime were jailed, and trade union leaders removed. A left-wing guerrilla movement began to grow. Great Britain said it could not handle the rebellion and asked the United States to come in. As a State Department officer said later: "Great Britain had within the hour handed the job of world leadership ... to the United States."

The United States responded with the Truman Doctrine, the name given to a speech Truman gave to Congress in the spring of 1947, in which he asked for $400 million in military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. Truman said the U.S. must help "free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The rhetoric was about freedom, but the U.S. was concerned about Greece's proximity to Middle East oil.

With U.S. military aid, the rebellion was defeated by 1949. United States economic and military aid continued to the Greek government. Investment capital from Esso, Dow Chemical, Chrysler, and other U.S. corporations flowed into Greece. But illiteracy, poverty, and starvation remained widespread there. The U.S. had succeeded in keeping in power a brutal military dictatorship.

In China, a revolution was already under way when World War II ended, led by a Communist movement with enormous mass support. A Red Army, which had fought against the Japanese, now fought to oust the corrupt dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek, which was supported by the United States but which, according to the State Department's own white paper on China, had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people. In January 1949, Chinese Communist forces moved into Peking, the civil war was over, and China was in the hands of a revolutionary movement, the closest thing, in the long history of that ancient country, to a people's government, independent of outside control.

The United States was trying, in the postwar decade, to create a national consensus of conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats, around the policies of cold war and anti-Communism. Such a coalition could best be created by a liberal Democratic president, whose aggressive policy abroad would be supported by conservatives, and whose welfare programs at home (Truman's "Fair Deal") would be attractive to liberals. In 1950, there came an event that speeded the formation of the liberal-conservative consensus – Truman's undeclared war in Korea.

Korea, occupied by Japan for thirty-five years, was liberated from Japan after World War II and divided into North Korea, a socialist dictatorship, part of the Soviet sphere of influence, and South Korea, a right-wing dictatorship, in the American sphere. There had been threats back and forth between the two Koreas, and when on June 25, 1950, North Korean armies moved southward across the 38th parallel in an invasion of South Korea, the United Nations, dominated by the United States, asked its members to help "repel the armed attack." Truman ordered the American armed forces to help South Korea, and the American army became the U.N. army. Truman said: "A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law."
The United States' response to "the rule of force" was to reduce Korea, North and South, to a shambles, in three years of bombing and shelling. Napalm was dropped, and a BBC journalist described the result: "In front of us a curious figure was standing, a little crouched, legs straddled, arms held out from his sides. He had no eyes, and the whole of his body, nearly all of which was visible through tatters of burnt rags, was covered with a hard black crust speckled with yellow pus...."

Perhaps two million Koreans, North and South, were killed in the Korean war, all in the name of opposing "the rule of force."

The U.N. resolution had called for action "to repel the armed attack and to restore peace and security in the area." But the American armies, after pushing the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel, advanced all the way up through North Korea to the Yalu River, on the border of China – which provoked the Chinese into entering the war. The Chinese then swept southward and the war was stalemated at the 38th parallel until peace negotiations restored, in 1953, the old boundary between North and South.

The Korean war mobilized liberal opinion behind the war and the president. It created the kind of coalition that was needed to sustain a policy of intervention abroad, militarization of the economy at home. This meant trouble for those who stayed outside the coalition as radical critics.

The left had become very influential in the hard times of the thirties, and during the war against Fascism. The actual membership of the Communist party was not large – fewer than 100,000 probably – but it was a potent force in trade unions numbering millions of members, in the arts, and among countless Americans who may have been led by the failure of the capitalist system in the thirties to look favorably on communism and socialism. Thus, if the Establishment, after World War II, was to make capitalism more secure in the country, and to build a consensus of support for the American Empire, it had to weaken and isolate the left.

Two weeks after presenting to the country the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey, Truman issued, on March 22, 1947, Executive Order 9835, initiating a program to search out any "infiltration of disloyal persons" in the U.S. government. In the next five years, some six million government employees were investigated. About five hundred were fired for "questionable loyalty."

World events right after the war made it easier to build up public support for the anti-Communist crusade at home. In 1948, the Communist party in Czechoslovakia ousted non-Communists from the government.
and established their own rule. The Soviet Union that year blockaded Berlin, which was a jointly occupied city isolated inside the Soviet sphere of East Germany, forcing the United States to airlift supplies into Berlin. In 1949, there was the Communist victory in China, and in that year also, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. In 1950 the Korean war began. These were all portrayed to the public as signs of a world Communist conspiracy.

All over the world, colonial peoples demanding independence were rebelling: in Indochina against the French; in Indonesia against the Dutch; in the Philippines against the United States. In Africa there were rumblings of discontent in the form of strikes, in French West Africa, Kenya, South Africa.

So it was not just Soviet expansion that was threatening to the United States government and to American business interests. In fact, China, Korea, Indochina, and the Philippines represented local Communist movements, not Russian fomentation. It was a general wave of anti-imperialist insurrection, which the United States wanted to defeat. This would require national unity, for militarization of the budget, for the suppression of domestic opposition to such a foreign policy.

In this atmosphere, Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, could go even further than Truman. As chairman of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, he claimed that the State Department employed hundreds of Communists, a claim for which he had no evidence. He investigated the State Department’s information program, its Voice of America, and its overseas libraries, which included books by people whom McCarthy considered Communists.

The State Department reacted in panic, issuing a stream of directives to its library centers across the world. Forty books were removed, including The Selected Works of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Philip Foner, and The Children’s Hour, by Lillian Hellman. Some books were burned.

McCarthy became bolder. In the spring of 1954 he began hearings to investigate supposed subversives in the military. When he began attacking generals for not being hard enough on suspected Communists, he antagonized Republicans as well as Democrats, and in December 1954, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to censure him for "conduct ... unbecoming a Member of the United States Senate."

At the very time the Senate was censuring McCarthy, liberals as well as conservatives in Congress were putting through a whole series of anti-Communist bills. Liberal Hubert Humphrey introduced a proposal to
make the Communist party illegal, saying: "I do not intend to be a half patriot." Lyndon Johnson, as Senate minority leader, worked to pass the censure resolution on McCarthy but also to keep it within the narrow bounds of "conduct ... unbecoming a Member of the United States Senate" rather than questioning McCarthy's anti-Communism.

John F. Kennedy, as senator, didn't speak out against McCarthy (he was absent when the censure vote was taken and never said how he would have voted). McCarthy's insistence that Communism had won in China because of softness on Communism in the American government was close to Kennedy's own view, expressed in the House of Representatives, January 1949, when the Chinese Communists took over Peking. Kennedy said:

So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the Lattimores and the Fairbanks [both scholars in the field of Chinese history, Owen Lattimore a favorite target of McCarthy; John Fairbank, a Harvard professor], with the imperfection of the democratic system in China ... that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China .... This House must now assume the responsibility of preventing the onrushing tide of Communism from engulfing all of Asia.

Liberal Senators Hubert Humphrey and Herbert Lehman proposed the setting up of detention centers (really, concentration camps) for suspected subversives, who, when the president declared an "internal security emergency," would be held without trial. This was added to the Republicans' Internal Security Act, which called for the registration of "Communist organizations," and the proposed camps were set up, ready for use. (In 1968, a time of general disillusionment with anti-Communism, this law was repealed.)

Truman's executive order on loyalty in 1947 required the Department of Justice to draw up a list of organizations it decided were "totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive ... or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means." Not only membership in, but also "sympathetic association" with, any organization on the attorney general's list would be considered in determining disloyalty. By 1954, there were hundreds of groups on this list.

The Truman administration initiated a series of prosecutions that intensified the nation's anti-Communist mood. The most important of these was the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in the summer of 1950.

The Rosenbergs were charged with espionage. The major evidence was supplied by a few people who had already confessed to being spies and were either in prison or under indictment. David Greenglass, the brother
of Ethel Rosenberg, was the key witness. He had been a machinist at the Manhattan Project laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico, in 1944-1945 when the atomic bomb was being made there, and testified that Julius Rosenberg had asked him to get information for the Russians.

Harry Gold, a chemist, already serving a thirty-year sentence in another espionage case, came out of jail to corroborate Greenglass’s testimony. He had never met the Rosenbergs, but said a Soviet embassy official gave him half of a Jello box top and told him to contact Greenglass, saying, “I come from Julius.” Gold said he took the sketches Greenglass had drawn from memory and gave them to the Russian official.

There were troubling aspects to all this. Did Gold cooperate in return for early release from prison? After serving fifteen years of his thirty-year sentence, he was paroled. Did Greenglass – under indictment at the time he testified – also know that his life depended on his cooperation? He was given fifteen years, served half of it, and was released. How reliable was Gold’s testimony? It turned out that he had been prepared for the Rosenberg case by four hundred hours of interviews with the FBI. It also turned out that Gold was a frequent and highly imaginative liar.

The Rosenbergs’ connection with the Communist party was an important factor in the trial. The jury found them guilty, and Judge Irving Kaufman pronounced sentence, saying they were responsible for the deaths of fifty thousand American soldiers in Korea. He sentenced them both to die in the electric chair.

Morton Sobell was also on trial as a co-conspirator with the Rosenbergs. The chief witness against him was an old friend, the best man at his wedding, a man who was facing possible perjury charges by the federal government for lying about his political past. The case against Sobell seemed so weak that Sobell’s lawyer decided there was no need to present a defense. But the jury found Sobell guilty, and Kaufman sentenced him to thirty years in prison. He was sent to Alcatraz, parole was repeatedly denied, and he spent nineteen years in various prisons before he was released.

FBI documents subpoenaed in the 1970s showed that Judge Kaufman had conferred with the prosecutors secretly about the sentences he would give in the case. Another document shows that Chief Justice Fred Vinson of the Supreme Court secretly assured the U.S. attorney general that if any Supreme Court justice gave a stay of execution, he would immediately call a full court session and override it.

There had been a worldwide campaign of protest. Albert Einstein, whose letter to Roosevelt early in the war had initiated work on the atomic
bomb, appealed for the Rosenbergs, as did Jean-Paul Sartre, Pablo Picasso, and the sister of Bartolomeo Vanzetti. There was an appeal to President Truman, just before he left office in the spring of 1953. It was turned down. Then, another appeal to the new president, Dwight Eisenhower, was also turned down.

At the last moment, Justice William O. Douglas granted a stay of execution. Chief Justice Vinson sent out special jets to bring the vacationing justices back to Washington from various parts of the country. They canceled Douglas's stay in time for the Rosenbergs to be executed June 19, 1953.

In that same period of the early fifties, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) was interrogating Americans about their Communist connections, holding them in contempt if they refused to answer, distributing millions of pamphlets to the American public: "One Hundred Things You Should Know About Communism" ("Where can Communists be found? Everywhere"). Liberals often criticized the committee, but in Congress, liberals and conservatives alike voted to fund it year after year.

It was Truman's Justice Department that prosecuted the leaders of the Communist party under the Smith Act, charging them with conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence. The evidence consisted mostly of the fact that the Communists were distributing Marxist-Leninist literature, which the prosecution contended called for violent revolution. There was certainly not evidence of any immediate danger of violent revolution by the Communist party. But the Supreme Court, led by Truman's appointee, Chief Justice Vinson, stretched the old doctrine of the "clear and present danger" by saying there was a clear and present conspiracy to make a revolution at some convenient time. And so, the top leadership of the Communist party was put in prison.

The whole culture was permeated with anti-Communism. An FBI informer's story about his exploits as a Communist who became an FBI agent—"I Led Three Lives"—was serialized in five hundred newspapers and put on television. Hollywood movies had titles like I Married a Communist and I Was a Communist for the FBI. Between 1948 and 1954, more than forty anti-Communist films came out of Hollywood.

Young and old were taught that anti-Communism was heroic. A comic strip hero, Captain America, said: "Beware, commies, spies, traitors, and foreign agents! Captain America, with all loyal, free men behind him, is looking for you ..." And in the fifties, schoolchildren all over the country participated in air raid drills in which a Soviet attack on America
was signaled by sirens: the children had to crouch under their desks until it was "all clear."

It was an atmosphere in which the government could get mass support for a policy of rearmament. The system, so shaken in the thirties, had learned that war production could bring stability and high profits. By 1960, the military budget was $45.8 billion, or 49.7 percent of the budget. That year John F. Kennedy was elected president, and he immediately moved to increase military spending.

Based on a series of invented scares about Soviet military buildups, a false "bomber gap" and a false "missile gap," the United States added to its nuclear arsenal until it had overwhelming nuclear superiority. It had the equivalent, in nuclear weapons, of 1,500 Hiroshima-size atomic bombs, far more than enough to destroy every major city in the world. To deliver these bombs, the United States had more than 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 80 missiles on nuclear submarines, 90 missiles on stations overseas, 1,700 bombers capable of reaching the Soviet Union, 300 fighter-bombers on aircraft carriers, able to carry atomic weapons, and 1,000 land-based supersonic fighters able to carry atomic bombs.

The Soviet Union was obviously behind—it had between fifty and a hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles and fewer than two hundred long-range bombers. But the U.S. military budget kept mounting, the hysteria kept growing, the profits of corporations getting defense contracts multiplied, and employment and wages moved ahead just enough to keep a substantial number of Americans dependent on war industries for their living.

Meanwhile, the United States, giving economic aid to certain countries, was creating a network of American corporate control over the globe, and building its political influence over the countries it aided. The Marshall Plan of 1948, which gave $13 (to 16?) billion in economic aid to Western European countries in four years, had an economic aim: to build up markets for American exports.

The Marshall Plan also had a political motive. The Communist parties of Italy and France were strong, and the United States decided to use pressure and money to keep Communists out of the cabinets of those countries.

From 1952 on, foreign aid was more and more obviously designed to build up military power in non-Communist countries. When John F. Kennedy took office, he launched the Alliance for Progress, a program of help for Latin America, emphasizing social reform to better the lives of
people. But it turned out to be mostly military aid to keep in power right-wing dictatorships and enable them to stave off revolutions.

From military aid, it was a short step to military intervention. After Iran, in 1953, nationalized its oil industry, the CIA organized its overthrow. In Guatemala, in 1954, a legally elected government, the most democratic Guatemala had ever had, was overthrown by an invasion force of mercenaries trained by the CIA at military bases in Honduras and Nicaragua and supported by four American fighter planes flown by American pilots.

The Guatemalan president, Jacobo Arbenz, was a left-of-center Socialist; four of the fifty-six seats in the Congress were held by Communists. What was most unsettling to American business interests was that Arbenz had expropriated 234,000 acres of land owned by United Fruit, offering compensation that United Fruit called "unacceptable." Col. Castillo Armas, put in power by the U.S. plan, had received military training at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He gave the land back to United Fruit, abolished the tax on interest and dividends to foreign investors, eliminated the secret ballot, and jailed thousands of political critics.

In 1958, the Eisenhower government sent thousands of marines to Lebanon to make sure the pro-American government there was not toppled by a revolution, and to keep an armed presence in that oil-rich area.

The Democrat-Republican, liberal-conservative agreement to prevent or overthrow revolutionary governments whenever possible - whether Communist, Socialist, or anti-United Fruit-became most evident in Cuba. Cuba's military dictator, Fulgencio Batista, had the support of the United States for many years. U.S. business interests dominated the Cuban economy, controlling 80 to 100 percent of Cuba's utilities, mines, cattle ranches, and oil refineries, 40 percent of the sugar industry, and 50 percent of the public railways.

Fidel Castro's tiny guerrilla force fought from the jungles and mountains against Batista's army, drawing more and more popular support, then came out of the mountains and marched across the country to Havana. The Batista government fell apart on New Year's Day 1959.

In power, Castro moved to set up a nationwide system of education, of housing, of land distribution to landless peasants. The government confiscated over a million acres of land from three American companies, including United Fruit.

Cuba needed money to finance its programs, but the International Monetary Fund, dominated by the United States, would not loan money
to Cuba because Cuba would not accept its "stabilization" conditions, which seemed to undermine the revolutionary program that had begun. When Cuba now signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, American-owned oil companies in Cuba refused to refine crude oil that came from the Soviet Union. Castro seized these companies. The United States cut down on its sugar buying from Cuba, on which Cuba's economy depended, and the Soviet Union immediately agreed to buy all the 700,000 tons of sugar that the United States would not buy.

In the spring of 1960, President Eisenhower secretly authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to arm and train anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Guatemala for a future invasion of Cuba. When John F. Kennedy took office he moved ahead with the plans, and on April 17, 1961, the CIA-trained force, with some Americans participating, landed at the Bay of Pigs on the south shore of Cuba, 90 miles from Havana. They expected to stimulate a general rising against Castro. But it was a popular regime. There was no rising. In three days, the CIA forces were crushed by Castro's army.

The whole Bay of Pigs affair was accompanied by hypocrisy and lying. The invasion was a violation of a treaty the U.S. had signed, the Charter of the Organization of American States, which reads: "No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state."

Four days before the invasion – because there had been press reports of secret bases and CIA training for invaders – President Kennedy told a press conference: "... there will not be, under any conditions, any intervention in Cuba by United States armed forces." True, the landing force was Cuban, but it was all organized by the United States, and American war planes, including American pilots, were involved; Kennedy had approved the use of unmarked navy jets in the invasion. Four American pilots of those planes were killed, and their families were not told the truth about how those men died.

Certain important news publications cooperated with the Kennedy administration in deceiving the American public on the Cuban invasion: *The New Republic* was about to print an article on the CIA training of Cuban exiles, a few weeks before the invasion. Kennedy asked that the article not be printed, and *The New Republic* went along. So did the *New York Times*.

Around 1960, the fifteen-year effort since the end of World War II to break up the Communist-radical upsurge of the New Deal and wartime years seemed successful. The Communist party was in disarray – its leaders
in jail, its membership shrunken, its influence in the trade union move-
ment very small. The trade union movement itself had become more con-
trolled, more conservative. The military budget was taking half of the
national budget, but the public was accepting this.

The radiation from the testing of nuclear weapons had dangerous
possibilities for human health, but the public was not aware of that. The
Atomic Energy Commission insisted that the deadly effects of atomic
tests were exaggerated, and an article in 1955 in the Reader’s Digest (the
largest-circulation magazine in the United States) said: "The scare stories
about this country's atomic tests are simply not justified."

In the mid-fifties, there was a flurry of enthusiasm for air-raid shel-
ters; the public was being told these would keep them safe from atomic
blasts. A political scientist named Henry Kissinger wrote a book published
in 1957 in which he said: "With proper tactics, nuclear war need not be as
destructive as it appears ..."

The country was on a permanent war economy which had big pockets
of poverty, but there were enough people at work, making enough money,
to keep things quiet. The distribution of wealth remained unequal. In
1953, 1.6 percent of the adult population owned more than 80 percent of
the corporate stock and nearly 90 percent of the corporate bonds. About
200 giant corporations out of 200,000 corporations – one -tenth of one
percent of all corporations – controlled about 60 percent of the manufac-
turing wealth of the nation.

When John F. Kennedy presented his budget to the nation after his
first year in office, it was clear that there would be no major change in the
distribution of income. New York Times columnist James Reston summed
up Kennedy's budget messages as avoiding any "ambitious frontal attack
on the unemployment problem." Reston said: "He agreed to a tax break
for business investment in plant expansion and modernization. He is not
spoiling for a fight with the Southern conservatives over civil rights. He
has been urging the unions to keep wage demands down ... During these
twelve months the President has moved over into the decisive middle
ground of American politics ...

On this middle ground, all seemed secure. Nothing had to be done for
blacks. Nothing had to be done to change the economic structure. An
aggressive foreign policy could continue. The country seemed under con-
trol. And then, in the 1960s, came a series of explosive rebellions in every
area of American life, which showed that all the system's estimates of
security and success were wrong.
Exercises

1. How does the U.S. government's "record in world affairs" prior to 1941 indicate that U.S. involvement in World War II promised not to be an effective blow to "imperialism, racism, totalitarianism, militarism, in the world"?

2. How do standard American history textbooks explain Roosevelt's reluctance to stop Japanese and German aggression? How does Zinn? Which interpretation do you find most persuasive, and why?

3. Why did the U.S. government promise the French that their "sovereignty will be reestablished as soon as possible throughout all the territory, metropolitan or colonial, over which flew the French flag in 1939" when two weeks later the U.S. government promised "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live"?

4. Why did Roosevelt promise that "the United States would not change its Palestine policy without consulting the Arabs"?

5. How did the United States ensure that it would control the international exchange rates after World War II?

6. The International Bank for Reconstruction expected to rebuild war-destroyed areas with foreign investment. After World War II, which was the only country that had money to invest? (Hint: which was the only country fighting in World War II that did not fight on its own soil?)

7. How did the structure of the U.N. allow it to be controlled by the United States, England, and France?

8. How does Zinn explain Roosevelt's failure to "take steps" that might have saved thousands of people from dying in Nazi concentration camps?
9. During World War II, women replaced men as factory workers. Why might this result in "a developing attitude of militancy or a crusading spirit," as observed by the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor?

10. If an economic motive could be attributed to the signing of Executive Order 9066, what might it be?

11. Why were there so many strikes by U.S. workers during World War II?

12. According to the character Red in Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead*, why were U.S. GIs dying in the jungles of the Pacific Islands? What experiences might Red have had before and during the war that would lead him to feel this way?

13. Why is it irony that eighteen leaders of the only organization that was explicitly pacifist were sent to prison for violating the Smith Act?

14. Why were most American blacks unenthusiastic and even unsupportive of the United States' participation in World War II?

15. Why did the Allies engage in saturation bombing of enemy civilians when Roosevelt had already labeled such actions as "inhuman barbarism"?

16. If the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not necessary to force Japan to surrender, why was it done?

17. Why did Truman claim, "The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians"?

18. Why were there so many strikes following the end of World War II?

19. How does "a permanent war economy" solve the "problems of control"?
20. How did the Truman Doctrine convince Americans that the U.S. government should support fascism in Greece?

21. Is the rationale for American involvement in the Korean War contradicted by its actions during the war?

22. How did the Korean War contribute to the forging of a liberal conservative consensus?

23. Is there any difference between Executive Order 9835 and the expulsion of non-communists in the Czech government in 1948?

24. How did the U.S. government portray the independence movements of the Indochinese, Indonesians, Africans, and Filipinos to the American public?

25. For what was Joe McCarthy censured?

26. What point is Zinn making by revealing the positions that Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and John Kennedy took regarding the government's anti-communist strategy of the late 1940s and early 1950s?

27. Why would such figures as Einstein, Sartre, and Picasso take such a passionate interest in the fate of the Rosenbergs (is it reminiscent of Mark Twain's concerns for Aquinaldo and his Filipino guerrillas)?

28. What role did the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) play in forging the consensus behind American foreign policy after World War II?

29. What was America's foreign policy after World War II?

30. What evidence was there that American communists were advocating the violent overthrow of the government?

31. After 1960, how did the U.S. nuclear arsenal compare to the Soviets’?
32. What was the economic goal of the Marshall Plan? What was the political goal?

33. Why did U.S. foreign policy support right-wing dictatorships? (Why did the United States overthrow democratically elected governments, e.g., in Guatemala in 1954?)

34. Was Fidel Castro an agent of Soviet expansion? How so? How not?

35. What measures did the U.S. government take to keep the Bay of Pigs invasion secret from the American public? Why did the U.S. government plot to overthrow Castro with such secrecy?

36. According to James Reston, what were Kennedy's budgetary goals for his administration? What conclusions does Zinn draw from this?

37. Debate Resolution: The United States entered World War II to expand its own empire.

38. Draw a map that identifies all the countries of Central America in relationship to the United States.

39. Draw a map depicting the World War II period (1939-1945) that includes the following: Allied nations, neutral nations, Axis powers, area of maximum Axis control.

40. Draw a map of Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East (1955) which identifies the following: NATO members, CENTO members, the Arab League, those countries that were under the control of the Soviet Union.